Ruhr Economic Papers
Ruhr Economic Papers #313
Board Accountability and Risk Taking in Banking – Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment
by Tobias Körner
RGS Econ, 01/2012, 39 S./p., 8 Euro, ISBN 978-3-86788-359-7 DOI: 10.4419/86788359download
In this paper, a law reform is evaluated that aimed at improving the corporate governance of German savings banks by tightening accountability and legal liability of outside directors. The causal effect of this reform on bank risk is identified by difference-in-differences and triple differences strategies. The estimation results show that savings banks subject to the reform increased capital and liquidity ratios. Hence, they have become less vulnerable to unexpected losses and liquidity shocks. This indicates that the low occurrence of outside director litigation reflects incentive effects of current liability regimes.
JEL-Classification: G21, G38, K20
Keywords: Corporate governance; outside directors; legal liability; bank risk