Ruhr Economic Papers
Ruhr Economic Papers #517
Explaining Differentials in Subsidy Levels among Hospital Ownership Types in Germany
by Adam Pilny
RGS, RUB, RWI, 11/2014, 31 S./p., 8 Euro, ISBN 978-3-86788-592-8 DOI: 10.4419/86788592download
German hospitals receive subsidies for investment costs by federal states. Theoretically, these subsidies have to cover the whole investment volume, but in fact only 50%-60% are covered. Balance sheet data show that public hospitals exhibit higher levels of subsidies compared to for-profit hospitals. In this study, I examine the sources of this disparity by decomposing the differential in a so-called facilitation ratio, i.e. the ratio of subsidies to tangible fixed assets, revealing to which extent assets are funded by subsidies. The question of interest is, whether the differential can be attributed to observable hospital-specific and federal state-specific characteristics or unobservable factors.
JEL-Classification: H25, I11, L33
Keywords: Hospitals; subsidies; ownership; Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition